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Abstract
As the rising costs of lifestyle-related diseases place increasing strain on public 
healthcare systems, the individual’s role in disease may be proposed as a healthcare 
rationing criterion. Literature thus far has largely focused on retrospective responsi-
bility in healthcare. The concept of prospective responsibility, in the form of a life-
style contract, warrants further investigation. The responsibilisation in healthcare 
debate also needs to take into account innovative developments in mobile health 
technology, such as wearable biometric devices and mobile apps, which may change 
how we hold others accountable for their lifestyles. Little is known about public atti-
tudes towards lifestyle contracts and the use of mobile health technology to hold 
people responsible in the context of healthcare. This paper has two components. 
Firstly, it details empirical findings from a survey of 81 members of the United 
Kingdom general public on public attitudes towards individual responsibility and 
rationing healthcare, prospective and retrospective responsibility, and the acceptabil-
ity of lifestyle contracts in the context of mobile health technology. Secondly, we 
draw on the empirical findings and propose a model of prospective intention-based 
lifestyle contracts, which is both more aligned with public intuitions and less ethi-
cally objectionable than more traditional, retrospective models of responsibility in 
healthcare.
Keywords Responsibility · Healthcare · mHealth · Lifestyle contract · Resource 
allocation
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Introduction
Healthcare expenditure has grown substantially in recent years [55], in part due to 
the rise of so-called ‘lifestyle diseases’ which are closely tied to behaviours such 
as tobacco use, harmful alcohol use, physical inactivity, and poor diet.
Individual responsibility for health has been proposed as a solution to unsus-
tainable growth in public healthcare costs, with the language of individual 
responsibility becoming more prominent within health policies and guidelines 
across the developed world [16, 28, 43, 52]. The first examples of lifestyle-
dependent healthcare access are beginning to appear [43], with access to treat-
ments, including elective surgery or fertility treatment, being restricted based on 
patient factors such as body mass index (BMI) or smoking status [31, 50]. In 
another example, the (since discontinued) 2006 West Virginian Medicaid Reform 
saw insurance coverage being held conditional upon on the fulfilment of patient 
responsibilities [9]. While cost-effectiveness is often lauded as a justification for 
such policies, in the absence of evidence that such restrictions are truly based on 
a robust cost-effectiveness analysis [43, 50], it seems that underlying attitudes 
towards desert and moral responsibility for ill health may be playing a covert role 
in health policy.
As Sharkey and Gillam [46] have noted, progress on the responsibility in 
healthcare debate has stalled. Much of the bioethical literature focuses on 
whether people should be given lower priority access to healthcare if they are 
responsible for their disease. This is a retrospective model of responsibility; the 
focus is on past behaviours and whether they causally contributed to a disease 
in a way that makes that individual morally responsible. Feiring [20] proposes a 
different model based on the concept of prospective responsibility, which is akin 
to having a duty or obligation. In a prospective framework of responsibility, the 
person is held accountable for the success or failure of an obligation, not for their 
past behaviours per se. Under Feiring’s model [20], an individual who causally 
contributed to their condition should be given equal priority at the first instance 
of medical need. To have equal access to future healthcare, however, they would 
need to commit to a lifestyle contract and attend medical follow-ups, where a 
lifestyle contract is, broadly speaking, an agreement entered into by a patient to 
participate in specified health behaviours or make behavioural changes. Failure 
to agree to, or fulfil, the contract would result in lower priority access to pub-
lic healthcare. This alternative approach to responsibility in healthcare may be 
a way forward in the ethical and political debate. We propose a modified version 
of Feiring’s prospective lifestyle contract model which has both pragmatic and 
normative benefits over the retrospective model, particularly in the context of the 
development of mobile health (mHealth) technology.
mHealth technology is quickly changing the landscape of healthcare. mHealth 
technology is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as “medical 
and public health practice supported by mobile devices, such as mobile phones, 
patient monitoring devices, personal digital assistants, and other wireless devices” 
[53]. In this paper, we focus on the specific subsection of mHealth technologies 
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targeted at monitoring or improving health behaviours, including devices such 
as Fitbits or pedometers. In addition to providing personalised health informa-
tion, technology may also provide a means to hold individuals accountable for 
their lifestyles. Health metrics and behaviours measurable by wearable mHealth 
devices have expanded to include transdermal blood alcohol levels [5], smok-
ing hand gestures [15], and compliance with oral medications [3]. In the con-
text of a growing burden of lifestyle-related diseases, the capacity to monitor key 
unhealthy behaviours has implications for the responsibility in healthcare debate. 
As a cautionary note, the mere existence of mHealth technologies does not neces-
sarily mean they should be used. Some technologies may be judged as too risky 
or too difficult to regulate, and therefore limited in their practical applications in 
a healthcare setting.
The combined kindling of fiscal austerity, an individualistic, neoliberal culture 
extending into healthcare [7, 33], and a scarcity of resources may increase interest 
in rationing healthcare based on patient responsibility for ill health. This makes it 
crucial to reconsider the ethics of such policies, to propose models of responsibil-
ity that avoid disproportionately harsh and punitive treatment of individuals, and to 
consider how rapidly developing health technologies may alter how responsibility 
for lifestyle-related illnesses is attributed. Most critically, in democratic societies, 
the political feasibility of new health policies can depend on public attitudes, for a 
proposed framework of individual responsibility in health which has both theoreti-
cal and public support may be more readily adopted into practice. It is imperative, 
therefore, that we come to a greater understanding of what public attitudes relating 
to mHealth and responsibility in healthcare are.
Our research aims to achieve the following three goals: (1) to explore public 
attitudes towards different methods of incorporating responsibility into healthcare 
allocation; (2) to explore public willingness to use mHealth technology to help 
determine responsibility; and ultimately (3) to build on Feiring’s [20] lifestyle con-
tract model and show that our empirically informed conceptual analysis supports 
a prospective framework of responsibility over a retrospective framework and that 
mHealth technology can serve as a useful adjunct in the prospective model.
Methods
To meet our research objectives, we designed a survey that we administered to UK 
participants via Prolific, an online crowdsourcing platform that anonymously links 
researchers with potential study participants. Participants (n = 101) were UK citi-
zens over the age of 18, gave informed consent, and were paid GBP2.40 for their 
time. The study was granted ethics approval by the University of Oxford’s Social 
Sciences & Humanities Interdivisional Research Ethics Committee.
The survey consisted of 31 items (see Online Resource 1), comprised primar-
ily of case vignettes and 5-point Likert-type items. For all Likert-type items, ‘1’ 
represented complete disagreement and ‘5’ represented complete agreement. Five 
questions were duplicated with permission, from an (as yet) unpublished com-
panion study investigating medical practitioner attitudes towards responsibility 
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as a priority-setting criterion in healthcare. Of these items, one is duplicated from 
Bringedal and Feiring’s survey [11] of Norwegian physicians. Two Instructional 
Manipulation Checks (IMCs) were included to screen for inattentive responses. Of 
the total 101 participants, 81 participants passed both IMCs and were included in 
the data analysis. Statements presented in a matrix format were randomised to con-
trol for order effect, unless the statement was order dependent. All questions were 
compulsory, barring those which requested participant demographics. Items 1-3 
were not included in the supplementary material (Online Resource 1) as they were 
preliminary questions regarding participant eligibility and consent.
Data analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS version 25 for Windows. Data 
obtained from Likert-type items was assumed to be normally distributed interval 
data, a decision which was made having considered the ongoing debate regarding 
the use of parametric tests on Likert-type data [10, 30, 49, 54]. Paired-sample t-tests 
or repeated measure ANOVA tests were used to assess differences across Likert-
type items. McNemar–Bowker tests for asymmetry were used on categorical data 
obtained from case vignettes. The null hypothesis was rejected at p < 0.05.
Our survey investigated the following topics.
General Attitudes Towards Individual Responsibility and Rationing Public 
Healthcare
5-point Likert-type items were used to assess the perceived acceptability of different 
justifications for rationing healthcare based on responsibility. We assessed whether 
participants believed people should be responsible for past behaviours on retributiv-
ist grounds (“just because that is what they deserve”) or consequentialist grounds 
(“because it will produce better outcomes for society”)(see item 5 of survey in 
Online Resource 1).
We also tested whether participants believed that there is a duty to oneself, one’s 
family, or one’s society to make healthy choices (see item 6 of survey in Online 
Resource 1).
Prospective Versus Retrospective
Each of the first two case vignettes (see Table 1) (see questions 18 and 19 of sur-
vey in Online Resource 1) presented one patient prima facie responsible for their 
medical need and one who was not, both of whom required the same scarce treat-
ment. The ‘responsible’ patient was willing to try to maximise medical benefit 
gained, unlike the ‘not responsible’ patient, who was unwilling to engage with an 
additional health-improving intervention. The participant was required to prioritise 
one of the two case patients or to grant them equal priority. Prioritising the ‘respon-
sible’ patient was interpreted as indicating a preference to allocate resources based 
on a prospective framework of responsibility, while prioritising the ‘not responsible’ 
patient was interpreted as indicating a preference to allocate resources based on a 
retrospective framework of responsibility.
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Do Intentions Matter?
A further two case vignettes measured whether participants valued the mere attempt 
to make healthy lifestyle choices or the ultimate outcome (Table 2). We compared a 
patient who had tried unsuccessfully to quit an unhealthy behaviour with a patient 
who had never attempted to quit in Case Alcohol Cessation, and with a patient who 
successfully quit in Case Smoking Cessation (see item 21 and 22 of survey provided 
in supplementary material).
Different Methods of Holding Patients Accountable Using Lifestyle Contracts
Concerns regarding the use of mHealth technology to hold people accountable 
for lifestyle choices were assessed, including concerns about personal and digital 
privacy, social equality, and the effect on the doctor–patient relationship. These 
were assessed in the context of both retrospective and prospective models of 
responsibility.
In response to a case vignette, participants indicated the perceived permissibil-
ity of several lifestyle contract monitoring methods, including no monitoring, tradi-
tional history taking, online self-reporting, and mobile health trackers.
Results and Preliminary Discussion
101 respondents completed the survey. 81 respondents passed both attention checks 
and were included in the data analysis. As summarised in Table 3, 55.6% of partici-
pants were between the ages of 18–34. 69.1% were female and 54.4% identified with 
some degree of left-wing political leaning. Almost half (45.7%) had previously used 
or were currently using a wearable device or health app.
General Attitudes Towards Individual Responsibility and Rationing Public 
Healthcare
We investigated whether participants believed people have a duty to look after 
their own health, and if so, to whom this duty is owed. An overwhelming major-
ity (93.8%) agreed either partly or completely that we owe ourselves such a duty, 
while 79.0% agreed either partly or completely that we owe our families the same. 
Table 2  Summaries of cases alcohol cessation and smoking cessation which assess whether participants 
preferred to allocate resources based on attempt or outcome of lifestyle change
Case alcohol cessation Case smoking cessation
Patient X Tried unsuccessfully to cease drinking Tried unsuccessfully to cease smoking
Patient Y Never attempted to cease drinking Tried successfully to cease smoking
Resource being 
allocated
Liver transplant Expensive cancer treatment
195
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Table 3  Demographic information of participants












Prefer not to say 0
Highest education level Primary school education 0
Secondary school education 27.2
Undergraduate tertiary education 48.1
Postgraduate tertiary education 24.7
Prefer not to say 0
Political orientation Very left-wing/liberal 11.1
Moderately left-wing/liberal 19.8
Somewhat left-wing/liberal 23.5




Prefer not to say 3.7
Digital tracker usage status I currently use a wearable device/health app 30.9
I have but no longer use a wearable device/health app 14.8
I have never used a health app or wearable device 53.1
Prefer not to say 1.2
Smoking status Never smoked 53.1
Ex-smoker 29.6
Current smoker 17.3
Prefer not to say 0




Don’t know/prefer not to say 25.9
196 Health Care Analysis (2021) 29:189–212
1 3
Interestingly, 64.2% agreed that we owe a duty to society to look after our own 
health. It seems that, even in a relatively individualistic society, there is nonethe-
less a sense of duty that extends beyond one’s immediate social circle. This may be 
particularly true in countries, like the UK, where healthcare is primarily accessed 
through the public system. With most participants believing in a duty to society 
regarding our own health, it may follow that failing this duty justifiably warrants 
consequences.
We also investigated general attitudes towards retributivist and consequential-
ist rationales for holding others responsible. The retributivist position, which holds 
that punishing wrong doers is of intrinsic moral worth, was represented by the state-
ment “A person should be held responsible for their past choices just because that is 
what they deserve.” The consequentialist rationale for holding people responsible 
because it promotes utility was represented by the statement “A person should be 
held responsible for their past choices because it will produce better outcomes for 
society.” Our findings suggested that participants disagreed, either partly or com-
pletely, with holding people responsible for past behaviours both on retributivist 
(72.8%) and consequentialist (54.3%) grounds. The difference in approval levels 
between the retributivist and consequentialist positions was statistically significant 
[t(80) = − 6.40, p < 0.001], with the consequentialist position being the less objec-
tionable of the two.
That people disagreed with holding others responsible is surprising and requires 
some explanation. In many domains of ordinary life, people often ascribe blame for 
perceived wrong-doing and hold the wrong-doer responsible, typically when the 
circumstances are such that the wrong-doer has a sufficient degree of intentional 
action, causal link to the given harm, and foresight that such a harm may arise [1]. 
The most likely explanation for our finding is that priming effects from the preced-
ing question on healthcare may have inadvertently contextualised the statements, 
and that participants believed that while people ought to be held responsible in ordi-
nary domains of life, the same does not apply in the special domain of healthcare. 
This is partially supported by our finding that in response to the 5-point Likert-type 
item “Healthcare priority should depend on the patient’s personal responsibility for 
Table 3  (continued)
Demographic information Category % of total 
participants
Frequency of alcohol consump-
tion over the last 12 months
Never 18.5
Less than monthly 28.4
Once or twice a month 22.2
1–3 times weekly 23.5
4–5 times weekly 3.7
Daily 3.7
Prefer not to say 0
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the disease”, participants disagreed overall, albeit not strongly (M = 2.96). In the 
context of healthcare, ill health could itself be considered a natural punishment, or 
that the withholding of treatment is a disproportionately severe consequence for the 
relatively minor transgression of an unhealthy lifestyle.
Prospective Versus Retrospective Responsibility
We found that participants were more favourable towards the notion of a prospective 
lifestyle contract than of retrospective responsibility. Of respondents, 65.4% agreed 
(M = 3.68) that priority access to healthcare should be lowered if multiple lifestyle 
contracts are broken, while 46.9% (M = 3.11) agreed with lowered priority access 
for a single broken lifestyle contract. In contrast, only 40.8% (M = 2.96) of par-
ticipants agreed that healthcare priority should depend on whether the patient was 
personally responsible for the disease. These results suggest that while participants 
were overall ambivalent towards using retrospective responsibility for ill health as 
a resource allocation factor, lifestyle contracts based on prospective responsibility 
were better received.
We also tested participant preferences for either retrospective or prospective 
responsibility with two case scenarios (Table 1).
In Blood Clots, 50.6% of respondents prioritised the ‘responsible’ patient who 
contributed to her medical need but was willing to change her lifestyle to make the 
most of medical resources to receive expensive surgical treatment. Only 17.3% of 
respondents prioritised the ‘not responsible patient’ who was blameless for their 
medical need but would not change his lifestyle to help maximise the use of health-
care resources. The remaining 32.1% chose to toss a coin to allocate the treatment. 
This suggests that participants cared more about maximising benefits from a scarce 
resource than punishing patients who have contributed to their medical need. Our 
finding that people tend to place a high value on social utility when allocating 
healthcare resources is consistent with the current literature [4, 19, 21, 22, 26, 45, 
47].
Although it was intended to reflect the same core moral principles, the case Hep-
atitis yielded dissimilar results. In comparison to the first case where 50.6% priori-
tised the ‘responsible’ patient willing to maximise responses, only 27.2% did so in 
the second case. 34.6% chose to prioritise the blameless ‘not responsible’ patient 
unwilling to maximise healthcare resources, while 38.3% chose to toss a coin. A 
McNemar–Bowker test revealed that participants were indeed responding asymmet-
rically across the Bloods Clots and Hepatitis cases [χ2(3, N = 81) = 18.57, p < 0.001].
We hypothesise that the reason for the discrepancy between the two response pat-
terns is due to uncontrolled variables. In Hepatitis, Gabriel, the blameless ‘not respon-
sible’ patient unwilling to maximise resources, requires medical care due to a contami-
nated blood transfusion. Unlike Gabriel’s homologue in Blood Clots, Gabriel has been 
harmed by the healthcare system and may have been perceived to have an additional 
claim to assistance. Furthermore, the ‘responsible’ patient in Hepatitis contracted the 
disease through the highly stigmatised behaviour of illicit intravenous drug use, poten-
tially also skewing participants’ responses in Gabriel’s favour. It is notable that 27.2% 
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of participants nonetheless opted to prioritise the ‘responsible’ patient who was more 
likely to produce the maximal benefits from the medication, despite their intravenous 
drug use.
Across these two cases, results suggest that participants do find patient willingness 
to take on responsibilities to produce the most expected good from a resource to be 
morally relevant. While this may be outweighed by other factors, such as being owed 
healthcare as a form of corrective justice, the concept of prospective responsibility 
appears to have some intuitive appeal. Notably, the cases presented demonstrate rela-
tively clear causal relationships between behaviours and health outcomes. Public atti-
tudes towards prospective responsibility in cases with complex, multifactorial aetiol-
ogy, such as obesity, may be more difficult to interpret.
Do Intentions Matter?
A further two cases examined how much moral weight participants placed on the inten-
tion and attempt to make positive lifestyle changes relative to the eventual outcome (see 
Table 2).
In Alcohol Cessation, participants were approximately evenly split between favour-
ing the patient who tried to quit over the unsuccessful quitter and tossing a coin to allo-
cate the liver (51.9% and 46.9% respectively).
In Smoking Cessation, a strong majority (70.4%) favoured the successful quitter, 
while 28.4% prioritised the patients equally.
Interestingly, of those who prioritised the well-intentioned but unsuccessful quitter 
in Alcohol Cessation, 78.6% prioritised the successful quitter in Smoking Cessation. 
Meanwhile, only 36.8% of those who chose the egalitarian ‘toss the coin’ option in 
Alcohol Cessation maintained this position into Smoking Cessation; of the remaining 
participants, all but 1.2% prioritised the successful quitter over the unsuccessful quitter.
Overall, these findings can be interpreted as participants placing some moral value 
in the mere attempt to change an unhealthy behaviour. A successful attempt, however, 
is perceived to have relatively more moral weight, as evidenced by the large percentage 
of participants who switched from prioritising the mere attempt to prioritising ultimate 
success. It is unclear why participants held this intuition. It may have been on a conse-
quentialist rationale that the scarce resource would produce more benefit in an individ-
ual who has successfully given up a harmful behaviour. It may also be that participants 
attributed mental states or moral traits to patients based on whether they succeeded or 
failed a lifestyle change attempt [24, 34]. For example, participants may have uncon-
sciously believed that the successful quitter tried more conscientiously or had more will 
power than the unsuccessful quitter, and therefore deserved higher priority for health-
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Public Attitudes Towards Using Mobile Health Technology to Assess 
Responsibility in Healthcare
Participants held mixed opinions overall regarding the use of digital trackers 
instead of a discussion with a physician to assess lifestyle, with 44.5% agreeing 
and 40.8% disagreeing with such a practice. Due to the comparative strength of 
objections, however, the mean score (M = 2.90) for the Likert-type item indicated 
overall disagreement.
Predictably, participants had concerns about using mHealth technology to hold 
people accountable for their behaviours. We found that 59.3% of participants 
agreed either partly or completely that doing so would damage the doctor–patient 
relationship, while 65.4% agreed either partly or completely that people would 
problematically change their behaviours if they were being monitored. Interpreta-
tions of what constitutes problematic changes in behaviour might differ between 
participants, but might include making behavioural changes for undesirable 
reasons or taking advantage of flaws in the monitoring devices to misrepresent 
health behaviours.
While the difference did not reach standard statistical significance on this small 
sample [t(80) = − 1.96, p = 0.054], participants appeared slightly more likely 
to approve of using mHealth technology to monitor adherence to a lifestyle con-
tract (M = 3.26) than of determining whether past behaviour contributed to illness 
(M = 3.01).
All ethical issues regarding mHealth included in the survey were deemed more 
problematic in a retrospective context than in a prospective context. Participants 
agreed that using data after the fact to assess past behaviours would pose unaccepta-
ble risks to data privacy (M = 3.60), more so than if it were used as part of a lifestyle 
contract (M = 3.30, t(80) = 2.79, p = 0.007). Participants also found mHealth tech-
nology to be fairer when assessing adherence with a lifestyle contract (M = 3.38) 
than when assessing past behaviour [M = 3.06, t(80) = − 2.93, p = 0.004].
Although not found to be statistically significant, participants were also more 
concerned about personal privacy in the retrospective framework (M = 3.6049) than 
in a prospective framework [M = 3.40, t(80) = 1.85, p = 0.068]. On a larger sample, 
this may have achieved statistical significance.
All four methods of monitoring adherence with a hypothetical lifestyle contract, 
which included no monitoring, traditional history taking with a physician, online 
self-report, and digital tracking, were perceived positively. Traditional history taking 
(M = 4.21) had the most support, and pairwise comparisons showed it was preferred 
over no monitoring (M = 3.28, MD = 0.93, p < 0.001), online self-report (M = 3.44, 
MD = 0.68, p < 0.001), and digital tracking (M = 3.35, MD = 0.86, p < 0.001). Means 
between the other methods were not significantly different. These results suggest 
that while participants prefer traditional methods of assessing compliance with pre-
scribed lifestyle changes, digital methods would also be acceptable as part of the 
process. The survey did not elucidate participant attitudes towards the role which 
digital technologies might play in monitoring lifestyle changes, for example whether 
they ought to be used as a sole monitoring method or an adjunct to more traditional 
methods of healthcare provision.
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Our survey findings should be considered exploratory; their generalisation is lim-
ited due to the skewed sample demographic, small sample size, and convenience 
sampling. Furthermore, it is prudent to note that our survey did not require partici-
pants to express the reasoning behind their intuitions and views, limiting hypoth-
eses regarding the basis of people’s intuitions. Though the ensuing discussion will 
be guided by our findings, we acknowledge that more robust empirical evidence is 
required (Table 4). 
Discussion
Based on key findings from our survey, it seems that the public prefers to allocate 
resources to individuals who would benefit the most, even if they are responsible for 
their illness.
These underlying beliefs are more consistent with a prospective, rather than a ret-
rospective, model of responsibility. In our sample, people were attracted to lifestyle 
contracts and more willing to attribute responsibility on the basis of them, including 
when using mHealth technology. We will now propose a new model, then relate it to 
our empirical findings on relevant public intuitions in more detail.
The Prospective Intention‑Based Lifestyle Contract Model
With a growing burden of lifestyle-related diseases in a climate of fiscal auster-
ity, there is the possibility of individual responsibility playing a greater role in 
Table 4  Summary of survey findings
Our key findings were
1. Participants believed in a duty to look after one’s health owed to oneself and, to lesser degrees, one’s 
family and society
2. Violated lifestyle contracts were more acceptable than personal responsibility for disease as justifica-
tions for lowering an individual’s future healthcare priority, particularly if multiple contract viola-
tions occurred.
3. Participants appeared to prefer holding patients prospectively responsible than retrospectively 
responsible, when doing so was a more efficient allocation of scarce resources. This is consistent 
with their preference for a consequentialist rather than retributivist reasoning for holding others 
responsible.
4. Participant responses suggested that the mere attempt to make a healthy lifestyle change, even if 
unsuccessful, has some moral value. However, they preferred that scarce resources be allocated 
to individuals who had successfully made a change in comparison to individuals who had tried 
equally hard but were unsuccessful.
5. Although participants had concerns about using mHealth technology to monitor lifestyles, it was sig-
nificantly less objectionable in the context of a lifestyle contract than using the technology to reveal 
data about past lifestyle choices. Furthermore, while traditional history taking with a doctor was 
most preferred as a method of monitoring lifestyle contracts, a range of non-traditional methods, 
including digital tracking technology and online self-report, were also perceived to be acceptable 
methods of monitoring lifestyle contracts and may be useful as adjuncts
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public healthcare rationing. Philosophy does not exist in a vacuum. It may be 
that philosophical opposition to the responsibilisation in healthcare will be una-
ble to counter political momentum. An alternative method of holding individuals 
responsible for health may provide a path that is politically palatable as well as 
philosophically less objectionable than traditional retrospective conceptualisa-
tions of responsibility in healthcare. It is not our intention to minimise the signifi-
cance of social inequalities which contribute to poor health [35] or detract from 
the need for largescale public health initiatives; rather, we hope only to offer a 
harm reductionist approach to responsibilisation in healthcare.
At its core, Feiring’s [20] model proposes that an individual who contributed 
to their condition should be given equal priority at the first instance of lifestyle-
related medical need. To have equal access to future healthcare, however, they 
must commit to a lifestyle contract supported by medical follow-ups to achieve 
the contracted goal to, for example, lose weight or quit smoking. Failure to agree 
to, or successfully fulfil, the contract would result in deprioritised public health-
care access. Building on Feiring’s [20] lifestyle contract model, we will now 
outline our version of the lifestyle contract model. It retains Feiring’s core idea 
but differs in several key aspects. Firstly, Feiring assesses fulfillment of a con-
tract based on the ultimate outcome, while we require only that patients make a 
sincere attempt to make the contracted behavioural change. Secondly, we stress 
that the lifestyle contract should be reasonably achievable based on the patient’s 
social and environmental circumstances, and that appropriate support services be 
made available. Finally, our model shows how mHealth technology can be used 
as an adjunct to facilitate the assessment of whether a lifestyle contract has been 
fulfilled in addition to broadening the range of reasonably achievable lifestyle 
contracts.
Under our proposed model, a patient whose lifestyle has contributed to their 
illness will have standard access at the first instance to scarce healthcare resources 
(Fig. 1). At this time, they will be given a lifestyle contract that commits them to 
certain conditions. If the contract is rejected or the requirements are not met, then 
their priority will be lowered for future instances of related healthcare need. The 
lifestyle contract should only contract behaviours that are likely to significantly 
improve the overall utility of the healthcare resource received. For example, 
the contract for a recipient of a liver transplant for alcohol-related liver disease 
Fig. 1  Schematic of lifestyle contract timeline
202 Health Care Analysis (2021) 29:189–212
1 3
should limit only risky behaviours that can reasonably be expected to damage 
the new liver, such as non-compliance with immunosuppressive medications or 
excessive alcohol intake.
Moreover, the lifestyle contract would assess the nature of the attempt to make 
a lifestyle change rather than the ultimate outcome. If the patient demonstrates a 
genuine attempt to change their behaviour, even if ultimately unsuccessful, then the 
patient is not deprioritised. For example, in the case of smoking, actively engaging 
with a formal cessation program may be sufficient to fulfil their contract. Bærøe and 
Cappelen [6] support a similar modification to Feiring’s lifestyle contract model, 
although they assess only whether a patient has attended relevant support services.
Requiring a sincere attempt at a lifestyle modification is less ethically problem-
atic than Feiring’s model [20], as it represents a more realistic expectation of people. 
Furthermore, the contracted lifestyle modification should also be reasonably achiev-
able for an individual’s socioeconomic circumstances which may impact a person’s 
ability to make the required change to varying degrees throughout a contract. For 
example, any resources or services required to fulfil the contract ought to be acces-
sible and affordable, and any pre-existing social stressors which may limit the indi-
vidual’s capacity to attempt to make difficult behavioural changes ought to be taken 
into account when drawing up the contract. These conditions are reminiscent of 
Savulescu’s and Davies’ concept of a Golden Opportunity [17, 44], which stipulates 
a set of conditions which need to apply to a health behaviour change in order for an 
individual to permissibly have health priority lowered based on responsibility if they 
choose to reject the change. These conditions include that the behavioural change 
must be realistically achievable for the individual and their circumstances, that the 
individual must be supported in making the behavioural change, and that there are 
clear consequences for failure to capitalise on the Golden Opportunity.
How, then, should a sincere attempt at a lifestyle change be assessed? An indi-
vidual’s sincerity and motivation in pursuing lifestyle change are internal states 
inaccessible to direct measurement, leaving external behaviours or self-reflec-
tion as proxies. The lifestyle contract should be created in consultation with the 
patient based on the activities or measures they feel they would realistically be 
able to engage in. Possible measures of sincerity of an attempt include engage-
ment with support services offered, for example, attending drug and alcohol 
support groups or participating in motivational interviewing sessions. Engage-
ment with in-person professional services, however, is not always feasible due to 
geographical factors or other time commitments. Participation in online behav-
ioural modification programs or tele-health services enabled by mHealth technol-
ogy may be more suitable for some individuals. Another possible lifestyle con-
tract assessment tool is an ongoing diary detailing the ways in which the patient 
attempted to make the relevant health behaviour change, in addition to circum-
stances or thought patterns which prevented them from doing so. Here, mHealth 
could serve as a useful adjunct in collecting data on individual behaviours, inten-
tions, and attempted improvements. While a physical diary may be preferable for 
some patients, they have the limitations of being cumbersome and conspicuous 
to use. In contrast, mobile phone usage is often already part of a daily routine, 
and logging thoughts and events digitally would be less socially conspicuous. The 
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individual could also set periodic reminders to complete the diary. Further add-
ing to the benefit of mHealth enabled versions of the diary, data obtained from 
wearable devices regarding, for example, medication adherence or blood alcohol 
level, could automatically be integrated with a partner app, allowing the genera-
tion of digital graphs or trends which illustrate patterns in the individual’s behav-
iour. Problematic behavioural patterns could then be identified and any triggers or 
circumstances which lead to poor health choices could be mitigated. For example, 
a wearable device detecting medication adherence might find that over a period 
of several months, a patient’s adherence is worse after night shift. Based on the 
identification of this pattern, the patient could trial targeted strategies such as set-
ting timed reminders.
Data from mHealth devices alone would not be grounds for failing a lifestyle 
contract, as it would be insufficient to assess the sincerity of the attempt at behav-
ioural change, however it may be used to support an overall assessment of an 
individual’s behavioural change efforts. mHealth devices thus serve dual func-
tions of supporting patients by providing information to troubleshoot unhealthy 
habits and improve health literacy, as well as providing objective data to support 
the assessment of whether a patient has fulfilled their lifestyle contract. The sup-
portive function may also help dampen the potential negative impact on the indi-
vidual’s relationship with their monitoring device.
Empirically Aligned with Public Intuitions
In comparison to retrospective models of personal responsibility in healthcare, 
our proposed prospective model is better aligned with the public intuitions elic-
ited in our exploratory survey. It balances efficient resource allocation with 
patient accountability for lifestyle-related illness, while improving the capacity 
for responsibility and providing a framework for individuals to take on greater 
agency in their health narrative [42].
Retrospective models of personal responsibility are usually based on desert-
based claims, whereby if a patient foreseeably and avoidably caused their disease, 
then they have weaker claim to scarce public resources. Our results suggest, how-
ever, that people are more concerned with maximising the benefits derived from 
public resources.
A lifestyle contract represents an actionable duty to society to look after one’s 
health which, our findings suggest, is generally supported by the public. If that 
duty is unacceptably violated and scarce resources are underutilised by a patient, 
then consequences follow in the form of lowered healthcare priority.
Just as our study participants felt the attempt to make a healthy lifestyle change 
had some value, our model also allows that a sincere attempt, even if unsuccess-
ful, to make the most of a scarce resource through behavioural change is suffi-
cient to do due diligence to one’s duty to society.
Finally, mHealth technology acts as an efficient and publicly acceptable tool to 
transparently quantify adherence with lifestyle contracts.
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Theoretical Advantages
Our prospective lifestyle contract model also has theoretical advantages over retro-
spective models. Using Bærøe and Cappelen’s [6] excellent summary of the major 
criticisms of personal responsibility in healthcare as a framework, we will consider 
the same objections against using responsibility in healthcare: (1) the harshness 
objection; (2) the avoidability objection; (3) the intrusion objection; and (4) the 
objection of causality. Additionally, we will consider a fifth objection, the efficiency 
objection, which has also been used to argue against incorporating responsibility in 
healthcare. On each front, we will show why our prospective model of responsibil-
ity fares better than a retrospective model, particularly when the possible impacts of 
health monitoring technology are considered.
The Harshness Objection and the Avoidability Objection
The related harshness and avoidability objections will be considered together.
At its core, the harshness objection argues that even if individuals are responsible 
for their illness, denying healthcare to them would be too harsh, punitive, and inhu-
mane [14]. Lowering healthcare priority may result in inability to access treatment, 
longer periods of suffering, or even death [14]. Therefore, the policy should not be 
endorsed.
Meanwhile, the objection of avoidability argues that one can be responsible for an 
action only if it was possible to have done otherwise. If there is no genuine alterna-
tive available, then the agent cannot be held responsible.
Whether the prospective model is too harsh seems to depend in part on the nature 
of the lifestyle contract. If the contract is very difficult to uphold, then failing it 
should not be considered blameworthy, and deprioritised access to future healthcare 
would indeed be too harsh. If, however, the contract is reasonably achievable, then 
the harshness objection is weakened.
The avoidability objection now becomes relevant. Part of why lowering prior-
ity based on retrospective responsibility is harsh is because we know that the social 
determinants of health (SDH) are strong influences on an individual’s health behav-
iours and health outcomes [35]. The SDH are defined by WHO as “the conditions 
in which people are born, grow, live, work, and age” [56]. SDH include factors 
such as race, gender, disability, education, income, education, neighbourhood, and 
social support networks, many of which are beyond an individual’s control. Over 
the last two decades, evidence has emerged that SDH are closely linked with life-
style choices, including poor diet, alcohol, smoking, and inactivity [36, 37, 48]. For 
example, fresh, healthy foods may prove unaffordable to those experiencing pov-
erty, while poorer neigbourhoods have a higher density of fast food outlets and con-
venience stores [27], encouraging consumption of foods with poor nutritional value. 
Indeed, the circumstances of one’s birth and early development have a range of 
lasting effects on health [36], including the development of cognitive control that 
promotes behavioural regulation. With the complex and far-reaching effects of SDH 
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in mind, there may be some individuals who, due to factors outside their control, 
would struggle to achieve a given lifestyle change in their respective circumstances. 
Some go as far as to argue that because external socioeconomic factors so strongly 
influence lifestyles and health outcomes, moral responsibility for lifestyle-related ill 
health cannot be attributed at all, as they may have been severely restricted in the 
range of choices genuinely available to them.
There are many factors which, if embedded in a lifestyle contract, would certainly 
render the contract not reasonably achievable and therefore too harsh a standard for 
allocating healthcare resources. To be considered reasonably achievable, the life-
style contract would need to take an individual’s SDH and socioeconomic circum-
stances into account and attempt to recognise where barriers to success may lie. For 
example, it must be financially feasible relative to income, and take into account per-
sonal circumstances such as health literacy or geographic location. The individual 
should also be involved in determining what changes might be realistically achieva-
ble. The greater the hardship and barriers faced by the individual, the less that ought 
to be required in the contract, lest the profound impacts of the social determinants 
of health be underestimated. Input from social work and other psychosocial sup-
ports may aid in temporarily mitigating socioeconomic hardship, however efforts 
to actively overcome barriers to healthy lifestyle choices, such as poverty, would 
be limited by the scope of the healthcare system. These barriers would be better 
addressed by largescale public health efforts targeted at social inequalities and SDH.
Our proposed model acknowledges that behavioural changes are difficult, par-
ticularly in disadvantaged populations, and requires only an attempt to make a rel-
evant behavioural change. If we assume there are far fewer people who could never 
make even a genuine attempt at behavioural change, then our model is less harsh as 
a standard to hold people to.
The core of the reasonably achievable lifestyle contract is to provide individuals 
with a genuine opportunity to try and make the most of the healthcare resources 
allocated to them. If an individual then fails to make a sincere attempt at a reason-
ably achievable contract while fully informed of the consequences, it does not obvi-
ously seem too harsh to deprioritise them. Even if we want to take into account the 
special importance of healthcare, perhaps by granting leniency in the number of rea-
sonably achievable lifestyle contracts that one can fail before being deprioritised, an 
endless number of fresh starts is not owed by society.
Moreover, mHealth technology can increase the range of potential reasonably 
achievable lifestyle contracts. For example, behavioural modification programs 
delivered by mHealth devices or wearable lifestyle trackers is one method of over-
coming geographical or time constraints, while emotional support might be made 
available through online social networks. Furthermore, mHealth devices can deliver 
health information at the individual’s own pace or in their preferred language.
Unless we are willing to discard intuitions about the existence of individual 
agency, there will be at least some circumstances where requiring a compe-
tent patient to make a genuine attempt at improving their lifestyle in a reason-
ably achievable way does not seem too harsh. This is provided that the social 
determinants of health mitigating the individual’s locus of control are taken into 
account, the consequences of failing the contract are proportionate, and there is 
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genuine scarcity of the required resource. It is notable that some of the empiri-
cal findings from our survey were derived from zero-sum cases, where resources 
could only be allocated to one of two patients; healthcare resource allocation is 
rarely so simplistic. There are, however, some resources which are clearly either 
scarce, such as organ transplants, or extremely costly to the public healthcare sys-
tem, such as novel curative treatments for hepatitis C [39]. While it may indeed 
be too harsh to require lifestyle contracts for any kind of treatment of lifestyle-
related illness, it applies to a lesser degree when the required resource is scarce 
or significantly burdens the public system. Furthermore, we do not support com-
plete withdrawal of publicly funded healthcare should a patient refuse or fail a 
proposed lifestyle contract, as this would be a disproportionate consequence. A 
plausible midground might be requiring the patient to contribute co-payments for 
future healthcare, relative to their ability to pay.
The intrusion objection
The intrusion objection argues that determining patients’ responsibility for 
behaviours, past or future, would be too demeaning and intrusive. A great deal 
of personal information may be required to determine whether someone’s behav-
iour contributed to an illness, and may include sensitive information about sex-
ual behaviour, recreational drug use, or mental illness. Requiring individuals to 
reveal such information, according to the intrusion objection, would be disre-
spectful and humiliating, and should thus preclude the use of responsibility as a 
healthcare allocation criteria [29].
Bærøe and Cappelen [6] have argued that the prospective model of responsi-
bility can stand up to the intrusion objection, provided that a lifestyle contract 
was offered to anyone whose condition could be improved by a lifestyle change, 
thus avoiding the need for information about past behaviour. This reads as too 
demanding. Many, if not all, conditions would likely benefit from a healthier 
lifestyle, which may extend to choices such as hazardous occupations, hobbies, 
sleep patterns, and locations of residence. If everyone, even those with relatively 
healthy lifestyles, were required to enter a lifestyle contract for equal priority, the 
contracted changes could become supererogatory.
In the contract-based prospective model, the monitoring method of lifestyle con-
tract adherence collects targeted information about the specific behaviour outlined 
in the contract, which may be facilitated by mHealth lifestyle trackers. For example, 
if limited alcohol consumption is part of a lifestyle contract following a liver trans-
plant, then only blood alcohol levels should be measured. Collecting information on 
only the contracted behaviour limits the intrusiveness of the lifestyle contract model.
mHealth may also alter the strength of the intrusion objection in other ways. 
Some may find revealing embarrassing information to an electronic device less 
confronting. After all, an electronic device is not capable of moral judgements or 
disapproval. By removing interpersonal factors, using mHealth in the assessment 
of responsibility may lessen the degree of intrusion experienced by patients.
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The objection of causality
The objection of causality argues that (1) to be morally responsible for an event or 
state of affairs, it is necessary to be part of the relevant causal chain leading up to the 
given event or state of affairs and (2) we cannot determine whether voluntary behav-
iours caused any given disease state in many, if not all, cases. [25] This is particu-
larly true of diseases with multifactorial aetiologies, where genetic predispositions, 
random gene mutations, and bad luck contribute in varying degrees.
Bærøe and Cappelen [6] argue that both the retrospective and prospective frame-
works are vulnerable to the objection of causality, because both frameworks use the 
patient’s past behaviour to determine whether they are responsible for their medical 
need, either to lower priority or to determine whether a lifestyle contract should be 
offered.
Aside from diseases with only one aetiology, such as single gene disorders, it 
seems unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, that we will be able to know what 
causally contributes to individual cases of illness and in what proportions. In a 
prospective model, a lower threshold of certainty could permissibly be applied to 
judgements of which patients were ‘responsible’ for their illness, because the conse-
quences of doing so are less severe when offering a reasonably achievable lifestyle 
contract and only ensuring a sincere attempt than when directly deprioritising the 
patient. Although we cannot be certain of a patient’s causal role in illness in either 
a retrospective or prospective model, in a prospective model there is less need for 
absolute certainty.
The objection of efficiency
According to the objection of efficiency, determining individual responsibility for 
ill health on a case-by-case basis would be extremely time-consuming, and would 
siphon healthcare resources from other areas of need [29]. It would, therefore, not be 
practically viable.
mHealth technology is particularly relevant here. Although not yet sufficiently 
sophisticated, innovations in mHealth technology will likely make it possible 
to monitor a wide range of physiological and physical parameters with minimal 
resources, such as blood alcohol level [5], calorie intake [3], smoking [15], and 
medication adherence [3].
Unless dramatically greater uptake of mHealth technology occurs, however, 
this is more advantageous for prospective models of responsibility than for retro-
spective models. Retrospective models would require the devices to have collected 
sufficient data and patient consent for data access. It is also plausible that people 
would avoid using mHealth devices to prevent future deprioritisation. These practi-
cal considerations limit the usage of mHealth technology to determine retrospective 
responsibility.
For a prospective model, however, mHealth technology may drastically reduce 
the resource intensity of assessing a sincere attempt to adhere to a lifestyle contract. 
It would likely decrease labour costs, as devices would take over some of the role 
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of monitoring lifestyle contracts. Continuous data collection would allow general 
trends to be made apparent to health professionals without in-depth history taking 
and provide valuable information to help the individual and their supporting health-
care team to identify problematic patterns. mHealth may also enable mass distribu-
tion of behavioural change programs as part of a lifestyle contract, costing little to 
create and maintain.
Limitations of the use of mHealth technology in lifestyle contracts
While the use of mHealth technology in the prospective model avoids some of the 
ethical concerns that arise in a retrospective model, it nonetheless poses possible 
risks. mHealth technology shares many of ethical difficulties beset by digital data 
as a whole, including risks to data privacy [12, 40, 51], murky data ownership laws 
[23], and poor oversight by regulative bodies [18, 32]. These issues also apply to 
existing health devices formally integrated into healthcare, such as continuous glu-
cose monitors (CGMs) [12]. Ultimately, stronger, enforceable regulations on data 
management are needed to protect users [23].
Regarding the usage of mHealth technology in prospective lifestyle contracts, 
possible risks include the undermining of individual autonomy [41], intrusions into 
personal (as opposed to data) privacy [13], an antagonistic relationship between user 
and mHealth device, and inaccessibility to socially disadvantaged populations [2]. 
While an in-depth exploration of these issues is outside the scope of this paper, we 
will outline some general principles which aim to mitigate some of the ethical risks.
1. Voluntary—A lifestyle contract should not necessarily involve digital monitoring, 
nor should there be a penalty for withdrawing from a lifestyle contract’s digi-
tal monitoring component, particularly if the patient finds using digital devices 
stressful or harmful.
2. Minimising intrusion—The device should be limited to collecting data directly 
relevant to the lifestyle contract and be discussed with the patient prior to the 
contract’s creation. The device itself should be unobtrusive. Social functions, 
such as sharing with other app users, should be limited.
3. Accessible—The patient should bear minimal costs from using the device. 
Patients should be adequately supported and educated in the use of the devices. 
Any health apps involved in the contract should be available in a language com-
prehensible to the patient.
4. Accurate—The devices should be of high accuracy to avoid false representations 
of patient behaviours, which may be damaging to the doctor–patient relationship.
Conclusion
Public healthcare systems are imperfect and rely on a limited pool of resources. 
Preventative healthcare and public health interventions are perhaps the most cost-
effective measures to tackle the growing burden of lifestyle-related chronic disease 
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[8, 38], and the effect of upstream social determinants of health on lifestyle-related 
chronic diseases cannot be underestimated. If, however, individual responsibility 
for illness becomes a more common rationing criterion, then our lifestyle contract 
model has several advantages over retrospective models.
The prospective intention-based lifestyle contract model is broadly supported by 
our key empirical findings. The model is concerned not with desert or punishment, 
but with the benefits that can be obtained from a limited pool of resources by a pop-
ulation in need. Our survey findings suggested that allocating resources to someone 
who was committed to making the best of a resource, even if they may have caused 
their illness, would be preferable to giving it to someone blameless but who would 
benefit less. Furthermore, the model recognises that successful behavioural change 
is challenging, particularly in the context of adverse socioeconomic circumstances, 
but that we can expect people to at least attempt to change their behaviours to max-
imise use of public goods. Finally, having found mHealth to be an acceptable tool, 
the lifestyle contract model also has the benefit of being able to utilise technology to 
support patients and provide an efficient means of holding them accountable.
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